Supreme Court dismisses claim for 6th Pay Commission scales by re-employed officers; here's why

In its judgment delivered on August 12, 2026, a bench of Justices N.V. Anjaria and S.V.N. Bhatti, in R.K. Yadav & Anr vs Union of India & Others (Writ Petition No. 193 of 2012), ruled that grouping the petitioners with the District Judiciary for pay fixation was "reasonable" and did not violate Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution.

The case history

The dispute goes back over a decade. The petitioners were appointed as presiding officers of CGIT-cum-Labour Courts at New Delhi and Hyderabad respectively. Petitioner No. 1 (Yadav), a judicial officer of the Government of NCT of Delhi, took charge as presiding officer of CGIT-I, New Delhi, on April 21, 2009 on deputation until June 30, 2009, and was then re-employed from July 1, 2009 to work up to the age of 65. Petioner No. 2 was also appointed as Presiding Officer of the CGIT, Hyderabad

The government's stand was that the pay scales of CGIT presiding officers had historically been linked to the District Judiciary. The First National Judicial Pay Commission, known as the Shetty Commission, had recommended pay scales for CGIT presiding officers equivalent to those of District Judges. Subsequently, the Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee recommended revised scales, which were implemented for CGIT presiding officers by order dated January 16, 2012.

The Padmanabhan Committee pay scales were as below:

• ₹51,550-1230-58,930-1380-63,070 for District Judge (Entry Level)

• ₹57,700-1230-58,930-1380-67,210-1540-70,290 for District Judge (Selection Grade); and

• ₹70,290-1540-76,450 for District Judge (Super Time Scale).

The petitioners were placed in the Super Time Scale, with petitioner No. 1 subsequently placed in the Higher Administrative Grade scale of ₹67,000 and ₹79,000.

The apex court noted that statutory rules had been framed over the years to revise pay for CGIT presiding officers. The 2015 Rules prescribed salaries for presiding officers.

After the Finance Act, 2017, the salary was fixed at ₹1,44,200 to ₹2,18,200, equivalent to Level 14 as per the 7th Pay Commission. The Tribunal (Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021 maintained the same pay level.

The judgment observed that the petitioners were re-employed officers. According to Central Civil Services (Fixation of Pay of Re-employed Pensioners) Orders, 1986, "re-employed pensioners shall be allowed to draw pay only in the prescribed pay scale/pay structure of the post in which they are re-employed. No protection of the scales of pay/pay structure of the post held by them prior to retirement shall be given."

The court rejected the argument that the petitioners had been wrongly equated with the District Judiciary.

"The industrial tribunals or labour courts in which persons like the petitioners are appointed as presiding officers are established within the State, and equating such presiding officers with the District Judiciary, excepting the presiding officers of National Tribunals functioning at Mumbai and Calcutta, is reasonable and does not book any arbitrariness," the judgment stated.

On the question of classification, the court held that re-employed officers constitute a distinct class.

"Upon re-employment, the re-employed officers/persons would cease to be homogeneous vis-a-vis class of regular officers in employment of the government," the court observed.

The judgment added that "their claim to avail the 6th Pay Commission pay scales has no basis to assert on the footing of Fundamental Rights or on any other grounds."

The court also reiterated that pay fixation is an executive function, citing an earlier ruling in the Union of India vs. T.V.L.N. Mallikarjuna Rao (2015), which stated: "The classification of posts and determination of pay structure comes within the exclusive domain of the executive".

The apex court also noted, "It is trite principle that the courts refrain from adopting a different view contrary to one seasonedly taken by the expert body, which is equipped with details and has the proficiency in the subject."

"The petition is devoid of merit. It is dismissed," the court said.